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REVIEWS
Embedding financialization: a policy review of the English 
Affordable Homes Programme
Stewart Smyth 
the Centre for Research into Accounting and Finance in Context (CRAFiC), sheffield university Management 
school, sheffield, uK
ABSTRACT
Decent, affordable housing continues to be a major concern for policy-
makers, providers and society at large. This paper contributes to the 
debate over the future of social housing in England by reviewing 
the Affordable Homes Programme (AHP). The AHP (2011–2015) saw 
the level of grant funding reduced dramatically; with the shortfall 
to be filled from housing associations own resources, increased 
rents and borrowing. To understand the implications of the AHP, 
this paper utilizes the concept of financialization. Financialization 
is a multifaceted process that seeks to explain the increased role 
and power of the financial markets in society. Specifically, the paper 
shows that the AHP leads to increased debt levels in the social 
housing sector, is predicated on short-termism and accumulation by 
dispossession. Finally, by employing financialization the paper also 
addresses debates about the nature of housing policy and how it can 
best be conceptualized.
1. Introduction
Decent, affordable housing continues to be a major concern for policy-makers, providers 
and society at large. The English housing system exhibits a range of dysfunctional charac-
teristics with the housing market being described as broken by the government (DCLG, 
2017). Private house builders are prioritizing profit-making and dividend payments over 
increasing the volume of homes built (Archer & Cole, 2016). Further, despite the wider 
housing policy emphasis on increasing homeownership, levels of owner-occupation are 
decreasing (Wilcox et al., 2016a). Homelessness acceptances in England stand at 58,000 per 
annum in 2015/16, nearly 50% higher than in 2010 (Wilcox et al., 2017, p. 94). A common 
policy analysis concludes that not enough houses are being built (Lyons Housing Review, 
2014); although this conclusion is not held by all. For example, Dorling (2014) argues that 
there has never been more bedroom space available in the UK, the problem is the inequal-
ities in access to, and distribution of, those homes.
This is exacerbated by a lack of government funding for public services generally (Hodges 
& Lapsley, 2016; Wilcox et al., 2016b). In these circumstances, government housing policy 
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has been geared towards delivering the maximum number of houses possible, for the limited 
public funding available. Through the course of the Affordable Homes Programme (2011–
2015)1 the Coalition government dramatically reduced the average level of grant funding 
per home provided to housing associations. The resulting gap in funding was expected to 
be filled from housing associations own resources, increasing rents through new affordable 
rent products and increased borrowing. Affordable rent products, is the government’s own 
term to denote a new form of rental home in England which lies between the lower social 
rents and full market rents. Affordable rent is commonly described as up to 80 per cent of 
open market rents, but is a contentious and much debated term.2 The creation of affordable 
rents as a category is relevant to this study because it allows additional borrowing (debt) to 
be taken on by housing associations.
This paper contributes to the debate over the future of social housing in England by 
reviewing the Affordable Homes Programme (AHP) within a financialization framework. 
Financialization is a multifaceted process that seeks to explain the increased role and 
power of the financial markets in society (Aalbers, 2016, 2017; Cooper, 2015; Fine, 2010; 
Lapavitsas, 2009). Specifically, the paper shows that the AHP not only leads to increased 
debt levels in the social housing sector but is also predicated on short-termism (Cooper, 
2015). Harvey’s (2003) concept of accumulation by dispossession is also utilized to show 
how the AHP is being subsidized by a transfer of public land at a discount or for free to 
aid new developments.
Research into the role of financialization in and through the state and public services 
is still in its infancy (Aalbers, 2017). Aalbers (2017) observes the contradictory actions of 
different state actors towards financialization: ‘Some state agents actively – but not always 
consciously – create the conditions for the financialization of housing and other assets, 
sectors and markets … while other state agents may try to limit financialization pres-
sures’ (Aalbers, 2017, p. 550). The analysis below highlights how a government department 
(DCLG) is mobilized to increase financialization in the social housing sector; but in the 
process its policy also has implications for the housing benefit budget of another department 
(DWP). This paper contributes to our understanding of financialization through the state 
with an empirical analysis of an actual government programme.
Furthermore, the framework and analysis allows for greater theoretical understanding of 
financialization and the nature of housing policy developments. This has relevance beyond 
the English housing system to the devolved administrations with the UK (McKee et al., 
2017) and other jurisdictions. In the process, this review seeks to address the call made 
by Madden & Marcuse (2016, p. 144) to move the debate about housing policy ‘beyond 
the shallow idea that the housing question comes down to determining the right balance 
between state and market’.
To achieve these aims, the paper is structured as follows: the next section sets up the 
theoretical framing by exploring the debate about the nature of housing policy (Madden & 
Marcuse, 2016) and ideas related to financialization (Aalbers, 2016; Cooper, 2015; Harvey, 
2012). This is followed by a section outlining the research design. Section four analyses the 
AHP policy by relying on policy documents issued by the government bodies and cover-
age of the policy in industry publications. Section 5 discusses how the AHP helped embed 
financialization in the social housing sector, before a concluding section re-addresses the 
debates on financialization and the nature of housing policy.
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2. Housing policy and financialization
This paper adopts a financialization framing through which to analyse the AHP (2011–
2015). The adoption of this framing is a deliberate attempt to overcome the limitations of 
housing policy analyses that see such policies as the actions of a ‘benevolent’ or a ‘meddling’ 
state (Madden & Marcuse, 2016). By utilizing financialization, the analysis will highlight 
both the nature of the AHP and allow for a broader comment on the nature of housing 
policy within an advanced capitalist state. Before exploring the literature on financialization 
and developing an analytic framework, it is necessary to set out a critique of the nature of 
housing policy.
2.1. The nature of housing policy
Housing policy in Britain has been subject to a series of step changes since the mid-1970s 
(Murie, 2012). The post-war consensus of expanding public housing based on a benevolent, 
interventionist approach to housing policy was abandoned (Murie, 2012). In its place, the 
dominant view of the neoliberal period has been of state withdrawal from direct housing 
provision. These views are critiqued by Madden & Marcuse when they state: ‘Housing policy 
is an ideological artefact, not a real category. It is an artificially clear picture of what the 
state actually does in myriad and at times contradictory ways’ (2016, p. 119). From a critical 
stance housing policy, as a concept, obscures the actual motivations and actions of the state. 
Housing policy is often portrayed as a consistent attempt, by successive governments, to 
solve housing problems (Marcuse, 1978). In this subsection, the assumptions that underpin 
this artificially clear picture are explored, before an alternative framing is expounded that 
links to the financialization framework developed later in the section.
The nature of housing policy is based on two related myths. The first myth is of a benev-
olent state which is trying to do its best to house its citizens. This myth recognizes that 
housing-related actions by the state have often failed but ascribes this failure to poor imple-
mentation, a lack of courage, self-interested parties or inaccurate knowledge (Marcuse, 
1978). The benevolent state myth was the dominant view among housing policy-makers 
and academics during the post-war social welfare state consensus in Britain. However, this 
view of the state has been criticized for lacking empirical evidence (Glynn, 2009; Madden 
& Marcuse, 2016) and ignoring the theoretical work of a range of critical theorists – for 
example, Harvey (2005), Milliband (1967), Peck (2010) – on the nature of the state in cap-
italist society. This is not to argue that individual housing programmes or policies do not 
benefit different sectors, for example low or middle-income earners, but these benefits are 
secondary to the priorities of maintaining political stability and the accumulation of private 
profits (Glynn, 2009; Madden & Marcuse, 2016; Marcuse, 1978).
The second myth is of a meddling state (Madden & Marcuse, 2016; Marcuse, 1986). This 
myth has gained significant traction in policy and academic circles over the past 40 years as 
the rise of neoliberalism and free-market fundamentalism has developed (Harvey, 2005). 
Advocates of the meddling state myth argue that the solution to the housing problem lies 
in letting the private market reach an equilibrium through the interaction of supply and 
demand. In this view, state actions related to housing become an intervention in the natural 
workings of the market. Therefore, housing policy should be geared towards getting the 
state out of the way of the market by reducing regulation.
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As with the myth of the benevolent state, the myth of a meddling state cannot be sustained 
when scrutinized. First, it is impossible for the state to withdraw from housing systems. The 
state and housing are intimately intertwined, through maintaining private property rights 
and legally enforcing contracts (the basis of both the owner-occupier and private-rented 
sectors) but also through funding public infrastructure (such as roads, schools) necessary for 
housing developments. Second, the idea that by the state withdrawing from direct provision 
of housing, the private sector house builders will fill the gap left lacks evidence to support 
it (Murie, 2012). Over the past 40 years, the private house builders continue to prioritize 
profit-making and dividend payments (Archer & Cole, 2016) over increasing the number 
of completions despite the reduction in social house building (i.e. the state getting out of 
the way).
In place of these two myths Madden & Marcuse argue that the ‘state has used the housing 
system to preserve political stability and support the accumulation of private profit’ (2016, p. 
120). This is not to argue that there is some sort of crude economic (or political) determinism 
at work, nor a ‘conspiratorial, unified ruling class that controls the state in an unchallenged 
way’ (2016, p. 120). As already stated individual state actions are often contradictory or 
lacking in substance when compared to the related political rhetoric. However, the twin 
(and related) strategies of preserving political stability and supporting private profit-making 
provide a useful basis on which to critically analyse the nature of housing policy.
Madden & Marcuse (2016) illustrate these twin strategies with examples from the US 
housing system, particularly from New York, but there are also examples in the English 
housing system that support this analysis. For example, Glynn (2009) illustrates a history 
of grassroots campaigning and resistance – from the Glasgow 1915 rent strike (Gallhofer 
& Haslam, 2006) to the anti-stock transfer campaigns of the past couple of decades (Smyth, 
2017a) – that has directly impacted on the actions of the state and how it has reacted to 
maintain political stability, when she quotes Prime Minister Lloyd George at the end of 
the First World War, who speaking in support of the 1919 Housing Bill said ‘Even if it cost 
a hundred million pounds what was that compared to the stability of the state?’ (quoted 
in Glynn, 2009, p. 287). This point was reinforced by a junior Minister at the time stating 
that ‘the money we are going to spend on housing is an insurance against Bolshevism and 
revolution’ (quoted in Harloe, 1995).3 Although these views are a century old they set the 
precedent that housing remains for various governments, an important part of maintaining 
the status quo.
As for private profit-making, the past century has a number of examples illustrating how 
state action has maintained or improved the conditions for such accumulation; for example, 
tax subsidies for private home ownership (such as Mortgage Interest Relief) or the Right to 
Buy policy for council housing tenants (Murie, 2016). A key implication of the arguments 
in this paper is that the AHP is another policy that enhances the accumulation of private 
profit through the use of increased private sector borrowing by housing associations.
However, it should be stated that while these two general strategies (of maintaining 
political stability and enhancing private profit-making) set the limits for the actions of 
the state with regard to housing, individual housing programmes can have beneficial out-
comes for certain low- or middle-income groups and individuals, at least in the short run; 
for example the Right to Buy policy (Murie, 2016). The argument is however that there 
are limits to such benefits and over the longer term the pursuit of political stability and 
profit accumulation will dominate. To capture this dynamic, the analysis below adopts a 
HOUSING STUDIES 145
dialectical understanding of the relationship between (economic) base and (political/state) 
superstructure, including housing policy:
[T]he actions of states … and other social institutions cannot be understood on their own but 
only in relation to what shapes the dynamics of society as a whole, which in a capitalist system 
remains the pursuit of profits and capital accumulation.
(Catchpowle et al., 2004, p. 1049)
The financialization framework developed below allows for a dialectically integrated political 
economy approach to understanding the nature of the AHP. In the process, financialization 
becomes the expression of the private profit-making strategy pursued in social housing by 
the Coalition government. The next subsection explores the literature on financialization, 
developing a framework relevant to analysing housing policy.
2.2. Financialization and housing
Financialization is a term that is increasingly being used to capture a range of processes 
which have become evident since the financial crisis of 2007/08; although the term has a 
much longer history.4 The term has been deployed in a number of disciplines. Christophers 
(2015) identifies three foundational versions of financialization: as processes of capital accu-
mulation and profit generation, whereby capitalism as a system has become financialized 
(Arrighi, 1994; Krippner, 2005; Stockhammer, 2004); in the realm of corporate motives 
and governance based around the shareholder value revolution (Froud et al., 2000); and, 
with the expansion of finance’s influence into the sphere of daily life, the lived experience 
(Martin, 2002). Deutschman (2011) argues that financialization can be seen operating at 
the macro-level (such as the studies by Arrighi, Krippner and Stockhammer), meso-level 
(studies by Froud et al., 2000; Haslam et al., 2015) and the micro-level (studies such as 
Langley, 2008; Martin, 2002). Aalbers (2017) recognizes the impact of financialization on 
the state and state finances as part of the meso-level processes (Deutschman, 2011).
In the housing literature, there is a growing focus on financialization (Aalbers, 2016, 
2017) which includes showing how social housing providers have become active in the 
derivatives market (with disastrous consequences in at least one case, the Dutch housing 
association Vestia) (Aalbers et al., 2017). Other housing studies have addressed the resistance 
that financialization of housing has generated (Fields, 2015); predatory lending practices 
(Newman, 2009); the changing nature of housing association finance sources (Wainwright 
& Manville, 2017) and securitization of mortgages (Aalbers, 2008).
The utilization of the financialization as a concept has been critiqued with Christophers 
(2015) setting out a series of limits (existing and potential) to this body of work and chal-
lenging academics who use the term to be rigorously specific. To that end, the framing 
utilized in this paper does not see financialization as a new process that has only existed 
for the past quarter of a century or that financialization is an inevitable, all encompassing 
process. Instead, financialization is an expression of the broader processes towards the 
neoliberalization of society (Harvey, 2005). It operates in conjunction with other concepts 
such as accumulation by dispossession (see below), privatization/re-commodification 
(Ashman & Callinicos, 2006) and globalization of the financial markets (Cooper, 2015). 
Therefore, this study’s use of financialization is located at the confluence of an analysis that 
identifies the over-accumulation of capital in the global capitalist system (Roberts, 2016), 
seeking new arenas to make profitable returns from the opening up of previously publicly 
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provided (de-commodified) services (such as social housing) to exploitation by private 
capital (Cooper, 2015; Harvey, 2005). In this context, the focus on how a government policy 
is designed to enhance financialization, is innovative and adds to our understanding of the 
impact of financialization through state actions (Aalbers, 2017).
Although the study is based on a specific jurisdictional context (i.e. England), it does 
address one of the other limits advanced by Christophers (2015) that of the empiric, by 
which Christophers means whether financialization is a real process. Taking just one ele-
ment of financialization, the increasing use of debt finance, as stated above the use of private 
finance (debt) is not new, indeed it is older than capitalism (Graeber, 2011); however, finan-
cialization is a real component of the processes involved with remoulding public services 
to the requirements of private capital. As Christophers (2015, p. 195) states in passing, 
financialization is the ‘frontier of accumulation’; in this case, in the social housing sector.
With the above discussion in mind, the analytical framework expounded below covers 
three themes – increased levels of debt; short-termism and accumulation by dispossession. 
Fine argues that the ‘current era of financialization is precisely one in which there has 
been not only a disproportionate expansion of capital in exchange, through extensive and 
intensive proliferation of financial derivatives but also the extension of finance into ever 
more areas of economic and social reproduction’ (Fine, 2010, p. 112). This process can be 
illustrated by the UK’s debt to GDP ratio which in 2014 stood at 252%; an increase of 30 
points since 2007 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015). The global financial crisis (GFC) of 
2008 was an expression of the longer term financialization trends. For example, total debt in 
the English housing association sector doubled between 1990 and 2006 (Wilcox et al., 2015, 
Table 71a). Politically, the impact of the GFC enabled the incoming Coalition government to 
institute the age of austerity, including cuts in grant funding, central to the AHP 2011–2015.
Therefore, the first analytic theme of financialization is the increased interest-bearing 
capital in the UK and global economies (Andersson et al., 2014). This theme also aims to 
capture the extension of private debt capital into an arena that was previously financed by 
government funding.
Cooper (2015, p. 71) argues that the maximization of shareholder value is the ‘guiding 
principle of financialisation’. Over the past 40 years, this has led to the adoption of short-
term strategies by directors of companies to maintain share prices (Deutschmann, 2011); for 
example, through the remuneration packages of directors. In the process, boards of directors 
increasingly engage in activities to maximize shareholder value in the short-term (not just 
increasing profits but also increasing share prices through share buyback schemes) even if 
this means reducing productive capacity (Cooper, 2015). Although, housing associations 
do not have shareholders in the manner of private for-profit companies, they are subject 
to policy decisions by governments that have spent the past 30 years implementing New 
Public Management-inspired policies (Hood, 1995), including private sector management 
techniques. On this basis, as financialization has grown in importance for management in 
private sector companies, it is to be expected that elements of financialization, including 
its expression in the form of the maximization of shareholder value, have permeated the 
policy-making of government departments. This is the basis of the second analytic theme 
with an emphasis on short-termism, drawn from the maximization of shareholder value.
While the foregoing are general trends across economies and societies, the role of hous-
ing and the city more broadly in the rhythm of capitalist development and accumulation is 
also relevant (Harvey, 2012) to the understanding the nature and working of government 
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policies. As we have already seen Madden & Marcuse (2016) argue that housing policy is in 
part driven by supporting the accumulation of private profit. One component of this drive 
is captured in Harvey’s conception of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003, 2005). 
Developed from Marx’s primitive accumulation (Marx, 1990), Harvey (2003, p. 15) argues 
that a ‘closer look at Marx’s description of primitive accumulation reveals a wide range of 
processes … All features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained 
powerfully present within capitalism’s historical geography up until now’. Harvey locates 
the need for accumulation by dispossession in the overaccumulation5 of capital that has 
plagued the capitalist system since the early 1970s.6 Accumulation by dispossession seeks 
‘… to release a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances 
zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn 
them to profitable use’ (Harvey, 2003, p. 149).
For Harvey privatization has opened up public assets, previously off-limits, to overac-
cumulated capital arguing that:
… if capitalism has been experiencing a chronic difficulty of overaccumulation since 1973, 
then the neo-liberal project of privatization of everything makes a lot of sense as one way to 
solve the problem.
(Harvey, 2003, pp. 149–150)
Accumulation by dispossession can be seen in social housing developments that reduce the 
council housing stock through demolitions producing fewer homes afterwards; or in the 
release of publicly own land for private development (Christophers, 2017). Accumulation 
by dispossession is relevant to understanding the specifics of the AHP but also enables a 
deeper understanding of the processes at work in the capitalist economy over recent dec-
ades. It provides a link to the analysis on which the critique of neoliberalism developed by 
Harvey (2005) sits and enables an insight into how different but related processes (in this 
case accumulation by dispossession and financialization) converge in the outworking of a 
specific government (housing) programme.
These three themes (of increased debt, short-termism and accumulation by disposses-
sion) form the basis on which the analysis of the Affordable Homes Programme is set out 
in Section 4 below. This financialization framing is also built on the earlier discussion of 
housing policy, especially the dual strategies of maintaining political stability and private 
profit-making from housing. The nature of housing policy will be returned to in the dis-
cussion and conclusion sections. The next section sets out the research design and how this 
framework was utilized to analyse the AHP.
3. Research design
This paper seeks to build on the previous policy review of the early years of the Coalition 
government in England from 2010 (Murie, 2012). An analysis of the AHP is appropriate as 
the programme represents a qualitative change in how below market-rented accommodation 
is delivered by the state. While elements were already present in the previous programmes 
(such as cuts in grant funding and intermediate rents – see below), it is the scale of the 
changes, including the almost complete absence of new build social rent homes that makes 
the AHP a turning point in housing provision in England.7
The analysis below is based on publicly available documents. The focus is on relevant 
documents produced by two government bodies, the Department for Communities and 
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Local Government (DCLG) and the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA). While the 
DCLG is the central government department responsible for social housing in England, 
they have transferred the funding of new build social housing and regulatory responsibility 
for social housing to a non-departmental public body, the HCA. The documents analysed 
include the AHP prospectus, along with updates and progress reports. A National Audit 
Office (NAO) (2012) report into the financial viability of the social housing sector under 
the AHP was also analysed.
These reports were supplemented with a review of media reports and opinion pieces 
in the housing trade publications. In the first instance, the reports and trade publication 
pieces were read to gain an understanding of the overall functioning of the AHP. Based on 
this initial impression the official reports were read closely to identify key aspects of the 
financialization process (Morales et al., 2014).
A common approach to analysing qualitative data is thematic analysis. Thomas (2011, 
pp. 171–172) sets out how themes can emerge through the constant comparative method. 
The aim of this method is for the researcher to regularly and iteratively revisit the data 
refining the themes each time. In contrast, Braun & Clarke (2006) identify that themes 
can be derived theoretically as well as inductively. The analysis in this paper follows Braun 
and Clarke with the themes derived theoretically from the financialization literature (i.e. 
increased debt levels, short-termism and accumulation by dispossession). Having derived 
those themes the relevant documents (set out above) were again read closely for both an 
overall understanding of the programmes design and for empirical evidence of the themes. 
In this way, the thematic analysis when applied to a social housing policy enables and 
generates deeper insights.
4. The Affordable Homes Programme – a policy review
Despite the perception that the UK possesses a weak welfare state, with housing as its 
‘wobbly pillar’, there is a long legacy of government intervention in the housing system 
(Murie, 2012). As alluded to above government interventions have continued in recent 
years although its form has changed – from one of supporting direct provision, through 
privatization programmes (such as the right to buy and large-scale voluntary transfer) to 
the current policies of market making and seeking increased private finance.
During the 1990s, the government pursued the Approved Development Programme 
(ADP), where eligible housing associations in England were able to access the Social 
Housing Grant (SHG) on a ‘mixed funding’ basis (Gibb et al., 1999, p. 109). The SHG 
was supplemented with private finance through the loan aggregator The Housing Finance 
Corporation (THFC) and/or borrowing direct from the private sector. For most housing 
association developments, the average SHG percentage declined from 75% in 1991 to 56% 
in 1998 (Gibb et al., 1999, p. 109), resulting in a gap in funding that was filled by increasing 
debt levels even if such funding was a minority contribution.
From 1997, the New Labour governments prioritized improving the condition of the 
existing housing stock, mainly in the social housing sector, through the Decent Homes pro-
gramme (DETR, 2000). It was only in later years that the emphasis of government policy 
changed to developing new social rent housing through the National Affordable Housing 
Programme, first launched in 2006 with the main round of bidding during 2008/11. The 
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key features of the NAHP are set out in Table 1, including planned expenditure and output 
levels, to allow for comparison with the later AHP 2011–2015.
4.1. The National Affordable Housing Programme (NAHP) 2008–2011
The NAHP was the Labour government’s flagship policy focused on addressing the shortage 
in affordable and social housing in England. The programme was delivered through the 
Housing Corporation and subsequently the Homes and Communities Agency, with the 
SHG remaining at the centre of this programme. The NAHP was delivered on a scheme by 
scheme assessment basis, where bidders had a range of ‘products’ (to use the government’s 
term) available to them including social rent homes, temporary social housing and various 
shared-ownership schemes. The programme also identified a role for intermediate rents8 
(a precursor of affordable rents) within very limited parameters.
There has not been a comprehensive assessment of this programme. However, while 
discussing the next generation AHP Wilcox and Pawson state that in ‘comparison with the 
three-year National Affordable Housing Programme (NAHP) running to 2010/11, the new 
AHP will generate just over a third of the annual output, though at only about one sixth of 
the annual cost in public subsidy towards initial capital costs’ (2013, p. 72). According to 
the HCA’s own statistics the NAHP delivered 150,300 homes at a total grant of £8.9 billion, 
with an average grant per home of just under £60,000 (Allen, 2011).
4.2. The Affordable Homes Programme (AHP) 2011–2015
The Coalition government’s policy on social and affordable housing initially appeared to 
focus on reforming the welfare system (including housing benefit) and lifelong tenancies. 
These reforms were consistent with the long-term aim of residualizing the social housing 
sector, which according to the government’s view should only be a temporary safety net; 
hence, the desire to remove lifelong tenancies for council housing tenants and replace them 
with five-year means-based tenancies. Further, the previous Conservative governments’ 
emphasis on privatizing the social-rented sector ‘was no longer the touchstone of policy’ 
(Murie, 2012, p. 1034). When house building was considered, the focus was on the failures 
Table 1. Comparison main features of Affordable Homes Programmes.
sources: nAHP 2008–2011 Prospectus; AHP 2011–2015 Prospectus, and Wilcox and Perry (2014, p. 56).
National Affordable Homes Pro-
gramme 2008–2011
Affordable Homes Programme 
2011–2015
Planned/approved units 173,900 80,000
government investment (planned) £ 8.9 billion £ 1.8 billion
government funding per home 
(planned)
£ 51,179 £ 22,500 
delivery model scheme by scheme bids Whole stock assessment over period 
of the programme
the main products •  social-Rented Homes
•  temporary social Housing
•  shared-ownership Homes
•  Affordable Rents (with four funding 
streams)
•  Affordable Home ownership
notes use of intermediate rents (a precursor 
of affordable rents) within limited 
parameters
social rent scheme are only to be 
supported in exceptional cases
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(perceived and/or real) of the planning system. Leading the Housing Minister at the time 
to write:
For decades house building has failed to keep pace with people’s needs. And recently, a com-
bination of the recession, divisive top-down targets and a public subsidy-driven approach 
has led to a catastrophic decline in the number of new homes … The previous system did not 
provide the right incentives for councils and local people to welcome the local growth that 
they can see is needed.
DCLG (2011, p. 4).
The Minister pointed out that the level of house building was at its lowest peace time level 
since 1923–1924.
Among the early announcements of the new government was an idea that is now central 
to the AHP, the affordable rent product. Affordable was defined as up to 80% of the market 
rate for that local area (HCA, 2011, p. 19). The basic idea is to generate additional incoming 
cashflows that could sustain higher levels of borrowing. This additional income stream 
allows the public subsidy through AHP to be reduced dramatically.
The other major change from the previous NAHP concerned the process for assessing 
the bids, with the funder stating:
We are looking for providers to set out their proposals for a four year programme covering 
how they will manage their existing assets and capacity – and in particular how they will use 
the flexibility to convert some of their current stock to Affordable Rent (or other tenures) – 
alongside HCA funding – to generate significant volumes of new supply.
HCA (2011, pp. 7–8).
In effect this meant a move from a scheme by scheme appraisal to a whole stock assessment 
over a four-year period, for each bidder. This whole stock assessment was implemented as 
the government had identified spare borrowing capacity in the housing association sector 
– see for example, Walker (2014) – and so housing associations were expected to set out 
the contribution they will make to support their proposals to deliver a programme of new 
supply (HCA, 2011 p. 9). In the new programme, the contribution from bidders was to 
come from four broad sources (HCA, 2011, pp. 8–9):
(1)  the additional borrowing capacity that can be generated from the conversion of 
social rent properties to Affordable Rent (or other tenures), as well as borrowing 
capacity generated by the net rental income stream of the new properties developed;
(2)  existing sources of cross-subsidy, including provider surpluses, income from devel-
oping new properties for outright sale and from planning gains9;
(3)  HCA funding where required for development to be viable, and
(4)  other sources of funding or means of reducing costs such as free or discounted 
public land, including local authority land.
It is here that all three elements of financialization outlined earlier are present. First, 
there is the additional debt the housing associations were expected to take on; second, there 
is the one-off consumption of existing resource highlighting the short-termism involved; 
and third, there is accumulation by dispossession where publicly owned assets (e.g. local 
authority land) were to be handed over for free or at a discounted level.
Alongside homes at affordable rent levels, the other ‘products’ available under the AHP 
2011–2015, included affordable homes ownership and mortgage to rent rescue schemes. 
Homes at social rent levels were only to be supported by government grant in exceptional 
circumstances.
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In July 2012, the National Audit Office published a report into the Affordable Homes 
Programme (NAO, 2012). The NAO reported that the AHP is expected to deliver 80,000 
affordable homes, for both rent and ownership, over the four years of the programme. The 
report summarizes the financial ingredients to fund these new homes:
The Programme is intended to build housing with a third of the grant per home of earlier 
affordable housing schemes. It will involve housing providers spending some £12 billion on new 
homes, funded by a combination of government grant (£1.8 billion), borrowing by providers 
supported by rents on the new properties (we estimate around £6 billion), and funding from 
other sources (about £4 billion). Rents totalling around £500 million a year on new homes 
will be paid by tenants, approximately two-thirds of whom are supported by housing benefit.
NAO (2012)
On a per unit basis, using the numbers in the NAO report, the average public funding grant 
is £20,000 per home and borrowing supported from the new rents will be £75,000 per home. 
Significantly, another £46,000 per home comes from ‘other funding’. This represents an 
increase of £12,000 per home on the previous programme. The total scheme cost of £141,000 
per home is also £14,000 lower than under the previous programme. These numbers led 
one commentator to the question: ‘So the programme relies more on other funding and a 
reduction in the total cost per home than it does on grant. Is that repeatable?’ (Birch, 2012).
Further, given that half of the necessary funding was to come from borrowing by housing 
providers, the NAO commented that ‘the Programme requires providers to take on increased 
borrowing, as well as other risks, for example committing to deliver housing over the whole 
of the period of the Programme at a fixed price, rather than agreeing commitments on a 
site by site basis’ (NAO, 2012, p. 14). Despite the NAO’s broadly positive assessment of the 
AHP’s design, a number of concerns have been identified. First, the NAO identified that 
using economic benefit to government cost ratio, the previous NAHP (based in the main on 
delivering homes at a social rent level) provides better value for money than the current AHP 
2011–2015 (NAO, 2012, p. 19).10 This point was further elaborated by a Capital Economics 
report which showed how higher grant levels, funded by redirecting housing benefit, would 
provide better value for money (Chaloner et al., 2015).
Second, the delivery of completed homes was heavily skewed towards the end of the 
programme; so that by April 2012, 18% of contracts had not yet been signed and over 
half of the homes were planned for the last year of the programme (Birch, 2012). Third, it 
appears the government was merely shifting support for social housing from one govern-
ment department (DCLG) budget to another (DWP), as the housing benefit system took 
the strain of the new Affordable Rent levels (Chaloner et al., 2015). Chaloner et al. (2015, 
p. 5) highlight that without changes in government policy the housing benefit bill would 
increase ‘… to £197.3 billion by 2065–2066, up from £24.4 billion’ in 2015. It was this mas-
sive increase that in part led the 2015 Conservative government to change its social rent 
strategy and implement annual reductions up to 2020 (NAO, 2017, p. 32).
The government department in charge of the Affordable Homes Programme 2011–2015 
has not completed an overall review of the programme, however Wilcox et al. (2016a, p. 
73) report that the actual programme outturn was 82,115 homes at an average grant level of 
£21,920 per home. Therefore, the AHP 2011–2015 outperformed its target of 80,000 homes 
and did so with a grant level of nearly £30,000 per home less than the previous NAHP 
(see Table 2.4.5, Wilcox et al., 2016a, p. 73). These numbers would appear to support the 
government’s aim of delivering the maximum number of homes possible for the funding 
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available. However, this was achieved at the expense of other indicators. The debt level in 
the sector has continued to grow, where debt per home has increased by £3,500 per home to 
£23,931 in the period between 2012–2015 (HCA Global Accounts, 2015, p. 27, 2016, p. 29); 
the NAO’s criticism of the poor value for money compared to the previous NAHP and an 
astonishing reduction in the delivery of new social rent homes: ‘The fall in output of social 
rented units is now very noticeable, from two-thirds of completions in 2010/11 to ten per 
cent now’ (Wilcox et al., 2016a, p. 72). Further, DCLG’s (2015) statistical report on housing 
associations’ returns reported that just over 70,000 homes were converted from social rent 
to affordable rent tenures between 2013–2015; at the same time the total additions to the 
social-rented housing stock was 97, 000.11 Therefore, 70% of social rent builds go to replace 
homes that are being converted to affordable rents.
The foregoing analysis has set out the contours of the AHP for England under the 2010–
2015 Coalition government, and in the process highlights a number of strengths and weak-
nesses. It has also shown how the three elements of financialization are evident in the design 
and application of the programme. The next section discusses the implications for housing 
policy and a possible future for some social housing providers.
5. Discussion
The previous section set out an analysis of the Affordable Homes Programme 2011–2015 
highlighting key aspects of the programme’s design and they way in which these aspects 
conform to the financialization framework, outlined in Section 2, including increased debt 
levels, a focus on short-termism and the release of public assets for private capital to exploit 
(accumulation by dispossession).
The most common theme among writers on financialization is the increased power of 
finance (or interest-bearing capital) in the economy (Aalbers, 2017; Cooper, 2015; Fine, 
2010). In part, this power comes from a simple increase in debt levels. In the social housing 
sector, the AHP is constructed in such a way as to increase debt levels, further embedding 
the power of finance capital in the sector. This is a deliberate and conscious move on behalf 
of the government and can be seen for example in the development of the new affordable 
rent product to sustain the higher levels of debt. It also fits with an established principle 
in social housing finance where the government considers that debt taken on by housing 
associations is part of the private sector and so does not count towards their measure of 
public debt (PSND). However, PSND12 as a measure is out of line with those used by the 
IMF, OECD and the credit rating agencies. The point is that government policy appears 
content to privatize the debt needed to build new homes, based on a socially constructed 
measure of government indebtedness.
Although falling outside the time frame of the AHP 2011–2015 the classification issues 
of housing associations, as public or private organizations, is illustrative of the tensions in 
the sector and the impact of government policy. In October 2015, the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) changed the classification of housing associations so that they were consid-
ered to be public bodies, whose debts are included on the government balance sheet in the 
same way as local authority housing debts. Despite this change, the government remained 
committed to the principle that HA debt should be held off-balance sheet. To achieve a move 
back into the private sector the government passed a series of reforms in the Housing and 
Planning Act, 2016 diluting the power of the regulator; resulting, in November 2017, with 
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the ONS removing HAs from the public debt measure. The outcome of this episode is that 
risk has increased in the sector and should a housing association find themselves in trouble 
the regulator now has less ability to intervene and prevent a financial collapse.
The focus on short-termism is not as immediately obvious in the AHP or prominent in 
the writing on financialization but is no less an important element. In the AHP, short-ter-
mism can be seen in three aspects. First, is the shift from upfront capital funding, in the 
form of higher grants (under the NAHP), to a reliance on higher rent levels that increases 
the welfare budget (i.e. revenue expenditure). The difficulties with a ballooning housing 
benefit bill were recognized and addressed by the new Conservative government in June 
2015, when they changed social rent policy to a one per cent reduction each year for the 
course of the parliament (Manville et al., 2016). However, this reduction also has the impact 
of reducing income streams for the housing associations, which impairs their ability to 
maintain interest payments and raise future capital funding. This is where affordable rent 
tenures and the conversion of social rents to affordable rents become centrally important 
to the future financial viability of the sector. In the process, social rent housing becomes a 
burden and a problem.
Second, short-termism is also seen in the value for money approach of the department 
and the HCA which was to deliver the largest number of homes given the funding avail-
able, even if this produced a lower cost to benefit ratio for the government. Third, the use 
of housing association resources, whether through the rationalization of housing stock 
(e.g. the sale of voids or conversions of social rents to affordable rents) or utilizing any 
spare borrowing capacity, are one time funding manoeuvres; which are considered to be 
unsustainable as a long-term funding model. These aspects of short-termism correspond 
to an aspect of shareholder value maximization identified by Cooper (2015) and Froud et 
al. (2000), where corporations are devouring their own resources to maintain their share 
price in the short term. In the case of the AHP, the conditions are created for not-for-profit 
organizations to mimic the actions of private sector corporations.
There are also elements of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005) present at the 
heart of the AHP. As part of filling the gap in funding left by the reduction in grant levels, 
the government expects public bodies will hand over land to housing associations either for 
free or at a discount. This land will then be exploited so that the housing associations can 
make profitable returns, often from sales at full market prices. The disposal of public land 
in England does not originate with the AHP but can be traced back to the Conservative 
government of the 1980s (Christophers, 2017). Christophers (2017) argues that the current 
programme of land disposals is privatization by default and through a number of ways this 
privatization is subsidized. When releasing this public land the state has ‘… often gone out 
of its way to ensure that such release occurs on terms that are maximally attractive to the 
land’s private-sector acquirers’ (Christophers, 2017, p. 76).
The housing associations are not the end beneficiaries of this dispossession process. By 
reducing the costs of developing new homes but charging a higher rental level (e.g. affordable 
or market rents), the housing associations are able to take on more debt. However, as the 
housing associations become more indebted the cost of maintaining that debt also increases. 
This leads to an accumulation of profits for a range of finance providers which include tra-
ditional banks and financial institutions who have lent to the sector for decades, but also 
those who lend to the large housing association through corporate bonds. The issuing of 
corporate bonds has been a growing trend in the sector since 2008 with the level of finance 
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raised from the financial markets now constituting a majority of the new debt in the sector: 
‘New debt is increasingly sourced on the capital markets. In total 41 bond issues or private 
placements were completed during the year, totalling £4.4bn’ (HCA Global accounts 2015, 
p. 8). In 2009, the total new debt was just £ 1 billion.
The increased private finance in the sector is going to have long-term consequences; some 
of which are already evident with pressure on housing associations to move away from their 
social rent to affordable and full market price homes (whether for sale or rented) (Apps, 
2015) and a change in accountability relations where management become focused on the 
latest credit rating agency evaluation (Smyth et al., 2017).
Ultimately, bringing increased debt levels into the sector also brings increased risk and 
the potential for instability. For example, interest rates during the AHP’s period (2011–2015) 
were at historically low levels, and while housing associations may have tried to manage 
the risk of future rate increases, both the underlying risk and the risk management strat-
egies increase the likelihood of future instability. To date there has not been an outright 
collapse of a housing association in England, although there needed to be a strong regu-
latory intervention in 2013 to avoid the collapse of Cosmopolitan HA (Robertson, 2013). 
However, internationally there are cases of social housing providers failing, for example 
Vestia in the Netherlands in 2011 which was bailed out by the Dutch Government to the 
amount of €2 billion (Aalbers et al., 2017). While the immediate cause of Vestia’s collapse 
was speculation using financial derivatives rather than increased debt, in the English sector 
there is an increasing use of derivatives as a means to mitigate movements in interest rates. 
Added to this the downgraded role of the regulator after the Housing and Planning Act 
2016, makes it more likely that the HCA will not be able to intervene and ‘rescue’ the next 
housing association that gets into financial trouble.
Further, based on previous experience of financial crises the government at the time will 
favour the financial institutions who lent the money (Harvey, 2005), covering their debts or 
bailing them out. In the case of Vestia (Aalbers, et al., 2017, p. 582), the Dutch Government 
covered part of the debt and ‘to make up for the losses, housing was sold off and rents were 
raised’. Further, the rest of the sector also suffered as the Dutch Government increased 
the regulator’s charges to create a collective safety net. The collapse of Vestia indicates the 
priorities of a financialized housing policy where the finance providers receive their money 
while governments and tenants suffer the losses.
There is a limitation to the above analysis in that it is focused on only one jurisdiction 
within the United Kingdom. Housing is a devolved responsibility to the governments in 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Over recent years, there is an evident divergence 
on housing policy between England and the devolved governments, which Wilcox et al., 
(2016a, p. 70) highlight by stating that ‘England is the only one of the administrations to shift 
its investment focus away from the needs of the lowest income households’. It is therefore 
inappropriate to empirically generalize from the case of the AHP 2011–2015 to the rest 
of the UK, nevermind internationally. However, theoretical generalizations of the use of 
government policy to embed financialization processes in new arenas are more appropriate, 
dependent on further empirical studies in different jurisdictions and contexts.
Returning to the actual housing system in England, at a time when the housing market 
is showing ample signs of dysfunctionality with a lack of supply (Lyons Housing Review, 
2014) and damaging inequalities (Dorling, 2014), the policies adopted by the Coalition 
government were moulded in the same thinking that brought the financial crisis and great 
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recession of 2008. There is a need to both redistribute access to housing and address the 
undersupply of non-market housing in England. Neither of which was the Affordable Homes 
Programme capable of doing.
6. Conclusion
By way of a conclusion, it is appropriate to reflect on the use of financialization as a fram-
ing for the above analysis and the nature of housing policy based on the discussion ear-
lier in Section 2. That discussion reflected a number of limitations (Christophers, 2015; 
Deutschmann, 2011) to how the literature on financialization has developed. In response, 
the analytic framing in this paper has been based on seeing financialization as an ongoing 
process that is one element of the continued neoliberalization of economies and societies 
more broadly. Locating financialization in this manner enables a link to other processes 
within the neoliberal canon such as accumulation by dispossession and new public man-
agement, thus allowing for a strong theoretical foundation to the analysis in this paper.
It is also important to remember that in the discussion earlier it was noted that the 
processes of financialization are not all-encompassing, are often contradictory and have 
generated some resistance. For example, the reclassifications of HAs – as public then pri-
vate bodies – by the ONS between 2015 and 2017 may solve the issue of keeping the debt 
off the public balance sheet but in the process has required a reduction in government 
regulation of the sector; which in turn creates another tension, increasing the risk that a 
housing association may default on its debts (Smyth, 2017b). There has also been resist-
ance to financialization where some housing associations have taken a deliberate decision 
not to engage with the AHP; have set affordable rents at close to social rent levels, or have 
refused to raise finance capital through a corporate bond issue (Smyth et al., 2017). There 
are also examples of tenants campaigning against the overall strategic direction of certain 
housing associations – see for example the tenant campaigns against two separate mergers 
of London-based housing associations (Cooper, 2017; Lal, 2018). The merger mania that is 
occupying many large housing associations is a response to the policy environment set by 
the current government; a policy environment which, as has been argued above, is driven 
by the financialization of a sector. This can be highlighted by the contents of a press release 
from early 2018 announcing a planned merger of housing associations, where one of the 
aimed for outcomes of the merged entity was to ‘become a financially stronger, more resil-
ient and more agile group with greater capacity and commercial acumen to better meet 
challenges posed by the external environment’ (Metropolitan, 2018).
The financialized funding policy being pursued by successive governments is forcing 
housing associations away from their social mission to become private sector housing devel-
opers whose main focus is on open market developments. Leading one anti-merger tenant 
to state: ‘We insist that housing associations support the traditional values of social housing 
and oppose the government’s attempts to destroy them’ (Lal, 2018).
Turning to the nature of housing policy and Madden & Marcuse’s (2016) challenge, on 
the need to move the debate beyond getting the balance ‘right’ between the market and 
that state. In place of this shallow dichotomy Madden & Marcuse posit the more radical 
conception of a continuum between the commodification/financialization and the de-com-
modification/de-financialization of housing in general. In line with general trends in public 
services over the past 40 years, the AHP takes another step towards a more commodified 
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and financialized (social) housing system. In this manner, the AHP further embeds finan-
cialization in the social housing sector.
The challenge for housing researchers is to develop alternative ideas that seek to halt 
these processes and then start to move housing policy towards the de-commodified and 
de-financialized end of the continuum. Developing such housing policies is likely to remain 
the single most pressing issue in housing research throughout the early decades of the 
twenty-first century.
Notes
1.  The 2015 general election saw a Conservative government elected, which while continuing the 
AHP 2015–2018 set in place by the previous Coalition government changed the emphasis of 
the programme towards homeownership. This, coupled with the far more dramatic changes to 
the social housing sector (such as a one per cent rent reduction and the extension of the right 
to buy to housing associations) means that the 2015–2018 AHP is not reviewed here due to 
space limitations. The 2015–2018 programme deserves to be the focus of a review of its own.
2.  For a flavour of the issues involved see the BBC Radio 4, Face the Facts programme ‘The 
affordable housing that’s unaffordable’, 8th January 2014. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/
programmes/b03nt9vr.
3.  For a fuller exposition of the relationship between housing and social unrest at the end of 
World War One see Swenarton (1981).
4.  The debates around financialization that have been present in many left-leaning economics 
journals over the past 20 years, often have theoretical roots in the Marxist-influenced analysis 
of Rudolf Hilferding first published in 1910 (Hilferding, 1985).
5.  Overaccumulation ‘… is a condition where surpluses of capital (perhaps accompanied by 
surpluses of labour) lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight’ (Harvey, 2003, p. 149).
6.  See Roberts (2016) for a full explanation and empirical exploration of both overaccumulation 
and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.
7.  It is relevant to note that the other devolved administrations have not followed England’s 
example and implemented such drastic cuts in grant funding.
8.  ‘Intermediate Rent – rents for homes let on assured short-hold tenancies must not be set higher 
than 80% of local market levels … and must not increase annually by more than RPI + 0.5%’ 
(Housing Corporation, 2007, p. 59).
9.  In England, this is also known as s. 106 contributions where developers of private market 
schemes should contribute a proportion to affordable homes sector.
10.  The Coalition government would disagree with this analysis pointing out that the NAO report 
commends the HCA and DCLG for designing a programme that provides the most number 
of affordable homes given the level of funding available.
11.  See Figure 4 (DCLG, 2015, p. 19) and Table 16 (DCLG, 2015, p. 32).
12.  For a fuller discussion on the current debate over PSND and GGGD see section 6 of Let’s get 
building report (NHA, 2011).
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